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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, in the 
interest of S.H., R.D., T.D., 
and P.D., children under 
eighteen years of agef 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner/Appellee, ] 
v. ] 
E.B. ) 
Respondents/Appellants ) 
) Case #20030191-CA 
Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
District Juvenile Court. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-
3 (2) (c) (1998), §78-3a-909 (1998), and Rule 3, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Appellantrs parental rights should be 
terminated based upon her performance under the court-ordered 
service plan? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Application of statutory law to the 
facts presents a mixed question of fact and law. This Court 
reviews the juvenile court's conclusions of law for 
correctness, affording the court some discretion in applying 
the law to the facts. State ex rel. G.B.. 2002 UT App. 270, 
111, 53 P.3d 963, citing In re C.B., 1999 UT App. 293, 15, 989 
P.2d 76. 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Appellant's parental rights should be 
terminated pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (1) (b) , (c) , (d) 
and (e)1? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Application of statutory law to the 
facts presents a mixed question of fact and law. This Court 
reviews the juvenile court's conclusions of law for 
correctness, affording the court some discretion in applying 
the law to the facts. State ex rel. G.B., 2002 UT App. 270, 
111, 53 P.3d 963, citing In re C.B. , 1999 UT App. 293, 15, 989 
P.2d 76. 
1
 UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 was amended by Chapter 246 of 
the 2002 General Session of the Utah Legislature, with those 
amendments effective as of May 6, 2002. The Notes, 
References, and Annotations to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 state 
that "[t]he 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, 
redesignated the introductory language and former 
Subsections (1) to (9) as Subsections (1) (a) to (i)." This 
case is unique in that portions of this case are guided by 
the pre-amendment statute while other portions are guided by 
the post-amendment statute; however, as Appellant argues 
below, the post-amendment statute pertains to the ultimate 
decision entered by the trial court in this matter. Thus, 
to avoid confusion, Appellant will cite to the post-
amendment statute throughout. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amend. VI and XIV 
Utah Constitution, Art. 1 § 7 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-407 (2) (Supp. 2002) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-407(3) (Supp. 2002) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
S.H., R.D., T.D., and P.D. are minor children 
(hereinafter the "Children") having been born on July 30, 
1985, September 9, 1988, November 23, 1990, and April 14, 
1994, respectively. Appellant, L.D. (hereinafter 
"Appellant"), is the mother of the Children. 
On May 25, 2001, the State of Utah (hereinafter the 
"State") filed its Verified Petition, alleging that the 
Children were abused and/or neglected (R0026-R0029). On July 
3, 2001, the Children were found by Judge Frederick M. Oddone 
of the Third District Juvenile Court to be abused and/or 
neglected (R0061-R0062). 
On or about July 16, 2001, Appellant appeared before 
Judge Christiansen of the Third Judicial District Court and 
was sentenced and placed on probation, to include sixty (60) 
days in jail. On July 17, 2001, since no appropriate 
alternate care was found for the Children and Appellant was 
serving time in jail, the Children were placed with the 
Division of Child and Family Services (hereinafter "DCFS") 
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(R0064-R0065). Appellant was released from jail on August 28, 
2001, having satisfied her sentence of sixty (60) days (Tr. at 
pp. 20-21). 
On December 27, 2001, Appellant's probation was lifted 
and she was required to serve the remaining 305 days of her 
one (1) year sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail (R0075-
R0076; Tr. at pp. 36-37). On March 14, 2002, the State filed 
its Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights 
(hereinafter the "Termination Petition"). On August 3, 2002, 
Appellant was released from jail, having completed her 
sentence (Tr. at p. 36). 
On August 23, 26, 27 and 29, 2002, the matter came before 
Judge Oddone for trial (the "Termination Trial") on the 
Termination Petition. See, Addendum "A." At the close of 
trial, in exchange for an additional sixty (60) days of 
reunification services, Appellant entered an admission to the 
facts alleged in the Termination Petition. See, Addendum "A" 
and "B." On September 9, 2002, the trial court entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (hereinafter, 
the "Initial Decision"), stating that it found statutory 
grounds to terminate Appellant's parental rights, but that it 
had reservations about whether it was in the Children's best 
interests. A copy of the Initial Decision is attached hereto 
as Addendum "C" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
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The trial court then ordered DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day 
service plan to Appellant. 
On November 6, 2002, the Guardian ad Litem (hereinafter 
the "GAL") filed the Guardian ad Litem's Motion to Enter 
Judgment on the State's Petition to Terminate the Parental 
Rights of Leanne Belong (hereinafter the "GAL's Motion") 
(R0291-R0293) . On December 23, 2002, the GAL's Motion came 
for a hearing before Judge Oddone. See, Addendum "B." At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Appellant failed to comply with the 
court-ordered service plan and concluded that it would be in 
the best interests of the Children to enter Appellant's 
admissions to the Termination Petition and terminate her 
parental rights in and to the Children. Id. 
On February 11, 2003, the trial court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Order Granting Guardian ad Litem's Motion 
to Enter Judgment on the State's Petition to Terminate the 
Parental Rights of Leann Delong (a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum "B"), and its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order Terminating Parental Rights (a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Addendum "A") (collectively, the 
"Termination Order"). Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal 
from the Termination Order on March 7, 2003. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 13, 2001, law enforcement was called and 
Appellant was cited for child abuse for an incident that 
occurred regarding the minor child, T.D. (R0026-R0029) . 
Appellant was on probation at the time of the incident. 
On May 25, 2001, the State filed its Verified Petition, 
alleging that the Children were abused and/or neglected 
(R0026-R0029) . On July 3, 2001, the Children were found by 
Judge Frederick M. Oddone of the Third District Juvenile Court 
to be abused and/or neglected (R0061-R0062). At said hearing, 
Judge Oddone placed temporary custody and guardianship of the 
Children with DCFS, but stayed the placement on a day-to-day 
basis and ordered DCFS to provide intensive protective 
supervision. 
On or about July 16, 2001, Appellant appeared before 
Judge Christiansen of the Third Judicial District Court and 
was sentenced to one (1) year for the April 2001 incident. 
The sentence was stayed and Appellant was placed on probation. 
Appellant's probation included service of sixty (60) days in 
the Salt Lake County Jail, and restrictions on her contact 
with the Children. Since no appropriate alternate care was 
found for the Children and Appellant was serving time in jail, 
the State moved the trial court to lift the stay and, on July 
17, 2001, the Children were placed with DCFS (R0064-R0065). 
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While in jail, Appellant attended the Mothers In Jail 
Parenting Program, including courses in the following areas: 
1. Communication Skills I (Styles) 
2. Communication Skills II (Specific skills with 
children) 
3. Discipline I (Styles, theory) 
4. Discipline II (Specific skills with children) 
5. Child Abuse Prevention/Coping Skills 
6. Domestic Violence Prevention/Coping Skills 
7. Daily Living Structures, Routines, Traditions] 
8. Child Development 
9. Child Health and Safety 
10. Child Nutrition 
11. Motion/Child Teaching and Bonding Activities. 
See, Defendant's Exhibit #7. Appellant was released on August 
28, 2001, having satisfied her sentence of sixty (60) days 
(Tr. at pp. 20-21). 
On September 6, 2001, the matter came for a review 
hearing before Judge Frederic Oddone, at which time Judge 
Oddone authorized supervised phone contact and therapeutic 
visitation between Appellant and the Children (R0067-R0068). 
On September 13, 2001, the State filed its Order to Show Cause 
against Appellant alleging that Appellant had attempted to 
have contact with the Children outside the scope of the 
September 6, 2001, Order of the trial court (R0069-R0070) . On 
September 27, 2001, the trial court found Appellant in 
contempt and committed Appellant to the Salt Lake County Jail 
for five (5) days. Id. The trial court additionally ordered 
no contact between Appellant and the Children. Id. 
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On or about September 27, 2001, Appellant completed a 
twelve (12) week Parent Child group through Cornerstone 
Counseling Center in which she was enrolled with the minor 
child, P.D. (R0255). On October 10, 2001, Appellant completed 
a parenting class entitled "Bridging the Gap." See, 
Defendant's Exhibit #5. In November of 2001, Appellant 
completed another parenting class through the Division of 
Youth Services. See, Defendant's Exhibit #6. On November 21, 
December 3, and December 10, 2001, Appellant attended family 
therapy sessions with the minor child, R.D. See, Defendant's 
Exhibit #14. From November 6, 2001, through January 4, 2002, 
Appellant attended seven out of eight sessions of a 
Communication Skills/Anger Management Group at Valley Mental 
Health (R0254). 
On December 27, 2001, Appellant's probation was lifted 
because of the findings from the Order to Show Cause hearing 
and she was required to serve the remaining 305 days of her 
one (1) year sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail (R0075-
R0076; Tr. at pp. 36-37) . From February 27 through March 12, 
2002, Appellant was released to a nonresidential program at 
Orange Street Correctional Facility (Tr. at p. 37). After 
realizing that Appellant was ordered to be in residential 
treatment and had been incorrectly sent to a nonresidential 
facility, the district court judge returned her to jail on 
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March 12, 2002. Id. at pp. 37, 39. While serving said 
sentence, Appellant completed the following programs on the 
dates indicated: 
1. Cocaine Anonymous, April 27, 2002. 
2. Uplifted Self Image class, May 3, 2002. 
3. Money Mastery class, May 14, 2002. 
4. Bible Study, LDS Institute of Religion, May 15, 
2002. 
5. Coffee Klatch, June 20, 2002. 
6. Choices for Adults class, July 1, 2002, which 
included classes on the following topics: 
a. Family of Origin 
b. Communication Skills 
c. Sexual Rights and Responsibilities 
d. Healthy vs. Unhealthy Relationships 
e. Gender Stereotypes 
f • Anger Management 
g. Diversity Awareness 
See, Defendant's Exhibits #1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. 
From March 20, 2002, through July 31, 2002, Appellant 
attended nineteen (19) sessions of the LDS Substance Abuse 
Recovery Program. See, Defendant's Exhibit #4. From April 
25, 2002, through July 30, 2002, Appellant attended twelve 
(12) sessions of Women's Substance Abuse Counseling through 
Cornerstone Counseling Center. See, Defendant's Exhibit 13. 
On August 3, 2002, Appellant was released from jail, 
having completed her sentence (Tr. at p. 36). On August 12, 
2002, Appellant attended an intake assessment at Cornerstone 
Counseling Center and was accepted into their Mother's and 
Children's Intensive Outpatient Treatment Program (R0242). 
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On August 23, 26, 27 and 29, 2002, the matter came before 
Judge Oddone for trial on the Termination Petition. See, 
Addendum "A." At the close of trial, in exchange for an 
additional sixty (60) days of reunification services, 
Appellant entered an admission to the facts alleged in the 
Termination Petition. See, Addendum "A" and "B." On September 
9, 2002, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order (hereinafter, the "Initial 
Decision"'), stating that it found statutory grounds to 
terminate Appellant's parental rights, but that it had 
reservations about whether it was in the Children's best 
interests. See, Addendum "C." The trial court then took the 
matter under advisement, ordered DCFS to provide a sixty (60) 
day service plan to Appellant, and ordered Appellant to 
strictly comply 100 percent with the court-ordered service 
plan, which was adopted at a hearing held September 9, 2002. 
See, Addendum "B." The order stated that if Appellant failed 
to comply with any aspect of the service plan, the State or 
the GAL could motion the trial court to accept Appellant's 
admissions and enter judgment terminating her parental rights. 
Id. 
Upon conclusion of the sixty (60) days, the GAL's Motion 
was filed. See, Addendum "B." On December 23, 2002, the 
GAL's Motion came for a hearing before Judge Oddone. Id. At 
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the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found by clear 
and convincing evidence that Appellant failed to comply with 
the court-ordered service plan and concluded, solely based 
upon that finding, that it would be in the best interests of 
the Children to enter Appellant's admissions to the 
Termination Petition and terminate her parental rights in and 
to the Children. Id. 
On February 11, 2003, the trial court entered the 
Termination Order, terminating Appellant's parental rights 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (1) (b) , (c), (d) and (e) . 
On March 7, 2003, Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal from 
the Termination Order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 was amended by Chapter 246 of the 
2002 General Session of the Utah Legislature this year, with 
those amendments effective as of May 6, 2002. At the 
conclusion of the Termination Trial in August of 2002, the 
trial court entered an order stating that, while it found 
statutory grounds to terminate Appellants parental rights, it 
could not find that it was in the best interests of the 
Children to do so at that time. The trial court chose to 
order the sixty (60) day service plan at the conclusion of the 
Termination Trial, thereby commencing a new action after the 
effective date of the 2002 amendments. The 2002 amendments to 
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UTAH CODE ANN, §78-3a-407 apply to the sixty (60) day service 
plan and, subsequently, the Termination Order. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the exceptional 
circumstances exception is ill-defined and applies primarily 
to rare procedural anomalies." State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74, 
112, 10 P.3d 346 citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 
3 (Utah 1993). This Court has previously dictated that 
"...the 'exceptional circumstances' rubric [may be employed] 
where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law 
color[s] the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State 
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah App. 1996). This case is a 
procedural anomaly where a change in law colored the ability 
to raise the issues argued herein at trial in this matter. 
This Court should address the matters under the exceptional 
circumstances rubric. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407(2) (Supp. 2002) states that 
"[t]he court may not terminate the parental rights of a parent 
because the parent has failed to complete the requirements of 
a treatment plan." On August 29, 2002, the trial court 
ordered DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day treatment plan for 
Appellant. On September 9, 2002, a hearing was held in which 
the trial court adopted the treatment plan as part of the 
court's order (R0259-R0265; R0267-R0270). On December 23, 
2002, the trial court in this matter found that Appellant had 
12 
failed to comply 100 percent with a treatment plan and, based 
upon that finding, concluded that it should enter the 
Termination Order terminating her parental rights. By the 
plain language of §78-3a-407(2) , the trial court abused its 
discretion in relying upon Appellant's performance with 
respect to the treatment plan to terminate Appellant's 
parental rights. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (3) (Supp. 2002) states as 
follows: 
(1) The court may terminate all parental rights with 
respect to a parent if it finds any one of the 
following: 
(b) that the parent has neglected 
or abused the child; 
(d) that the child is being cared 
for in an out-of-home placement 
under the supervision of the 
court or the division and and 
parent has substantially 
neglected, wilfully refused, or 
has been unable or unwilling to 
remedy the circumstances that 
cause the child to be in an out-
of-home placement, and there is a 
substantial likelihood that the 
parent will not be capable of 
exercising proper and effective 
parental care in the near future; 
(e) failure of parental 
adjustment, as defined in this 
chapter; 
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(h) the parent, after a period 
of trial during which the child 
was returned to live in the 
child1s own home, substantially 
and continuously or repeatedly 
refused or failed to give the 
child proper parental care and 
protection; . . . 
(2) The court may not terminate the 
parental rights of a parent because the 
parent has failed to complete the 
requirements of a treatment plan. 
(3) (a) In any case in which the court has 
directed the division to provide 
reunification services to a parent, the 
court must find that the division made 
reasonable efforts to provide those 
services before the court may terminate the 
parent's rights under Subsection (1) (b) , 
(c), (d), (e), (f) or (h) . 
As mentioned supra, the trial court ordered DCFS to provide a 
treatment plan to Appellant on August 2 9, 2002, and then 
relied upon its finding that she failed to comply 100 percent 
with said treatment plan to conclude that the order 
terminating her parental rights should be entered. Neither of 
the orders collectively included in the Termination Order 
addresses the services provided by DCFS as required by §78-3a-
407(3) (a) prior to terminating her rights under §78~3a-
407(1)(b), (c), (d) and (e) in this matter. The trial court 
clearly abused its discretion. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE 2002 AMENDMENTS TO UTAH CODE ANN, 
§78-3A-407 APPLY TO THIS CASE 
This Court recently handed down a decision on June 12, 
2003, in State in Interest of T.M., 2003 UT App. 191, at 120, 
respecting the retroactivity of the 2002 amendments to UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-3a-407, setting the filing date of the 
termination petition as the guiding date for whether the 2002 
amendments apply, but also stating that "the substantive law 
to be applied throughout an action is the law in effect at the 
date the action was initiated." Ibid, at 117, citing State v. 
Hiacrs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added)2. The 
Termination Petition in the instant case was filed on March 
14, 2002, almost two (2) months prior to the statute's 
effective date of May 6, 2002; however, the services at issue 
in this appeal were not ordered by the trial court until 
August 29, 2002, almost four (4) months after the statute 
became effective. 
2
 As of the filing of this brief, this Court's decision 
in State in Interest of T.M. has not yet been released for 
publication since the time for appealing has not yet run, 
and it is still subject to revision by this Court before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Even if the decision 
regarding the retroactivity of the 2002 amendments at issue 
here were overturned on writ to the Utah Supreme Court 
during the pendency of this appeal, the reversal would still 
be supportive of Appellant's contention that the 2002 
amendments apply to this case. 
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This case is a unique one in that it has not followed 
classical juvenile court procedure and is, in fact, a rare 
procedural anomaly. Typically, treatment plans and 
reunification services are not ordered by the juvenile courts 
after a termination petition is filed. Reunification services 
are ordinarily determined at the dispositional hearing 
following adjudication of a neglect, abuse or dependency 
petition, and extend for twelve (12) months following removal 
of the child(ren)3. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-311. If the child's 
goal is changed to termination of parental rights, 
reunification services are usually terminated either by motion 
of the parties or at a permanency hearing prior to, or in 
conjunction with the filing of a termination petition. UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-3a-312. The trial court is authorized, however, 
to extend reunification services for 90 days if it finds that 
there has been substantial compliance with the treatment plan, 
that reunification is probable within that 90 day period, and 
that the extension is in the best interest of the child. UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-3a-312 (3) (b) . 
In State ex rel. B.M.S., 2003 UT App 51, 115, 65 P.3d 
639, this Court reiterated the statutory requirements a trial 
3
 UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-312(6)(a) indicates, however, 
that a parent is not entitled to reunification services for 
any specified period of time. 
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court must adhere to in order to terminate a parent's parental 
rights, as follows: 
Utah law requires juvenile courts to make two 
distinct findings before terminating the parent-
child relationship. See In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11, \ 
18, 996 P.2d 1059. First, the court must find a 
specific ground for termination, as required by 
section 78-3a-407. See id. Second, the court must 
find that termination is in the child's best 
interests. See id. The petitioner bears "the burden 
of establishing both of these elements by clear and 
convincing evidence." In re R.A.J. , 1999 UT App 
329,1 7, 991 P.2d 1118. 
The trial court articulated in the Initial Decision that it 
found that there were adequate legal grounds to terminate 
Appellant's parental rights; however, it also found that it 
was in the best interests of the Children for reunification 
services to be extended (See, Addendum "C;" R0263). The trial 
court specifically articulated that "...the Court has 
reservations about whether a termination of [Appellant's] 
parental rights at this time [is] in the children's best 
interests." Id. In essence, the trial court could not find 
the second prong by clear and convincing evidence required for 
termination of Appellant's parental rights at that time. As 
such, the trial court entered the Initial Decision and 
exercised its authority to extend reunification services in 
accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-312 (3) (b). Id. 
Based upon its reservations, the trial court stated in 
the Initial Decision that it was taking the matter under 
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advisement for sixty (60) days. See, Addendum "C." In 
actuality, however, the trial court had rendered its decision 
on the Termination Petition in the Initial Decision, signed 
September 9, 2002. Id. Even with Appellant's admissions to 
the Termination Petition, the trial court could not terminate 
Appellant's parental rights at that time because it had 
reservations about whether it was in the best interests of the 
Children. Id. 
The trial court then commenced a new action by ordering 
DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day service plan to Appellant. 
Id. When the GAL's Motion was filed, it was not to lift a 
stay that was imposed by the trial court, but rather to hold 
a new trial in the form of an evidentiary hearing to determine 
Appellant's compliance or noncompliance with the court-ordered 
service plan. If Appellant did not comply, then her prior 
admissions to the Termination Petition would be judicially 
noticed and any new evidence would be considered by the trial 
court for a determination of the best interests of the 
Children. When a close analysis is undertaken, since new 
evidence obtained after the Termination Trial would be 
presented and relied upon in the final Termination Order, it 
is obvious that a new action was commenced with the ordering 
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of the sixty (60) day service plan. Hence, the governing 
statute in this case should be the 2002 amendments. 
II. THESE MATTERS SHOULD 
BE ADDRESSED UNDER THE 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES RUBRIC 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the exceptional 
circumstances exception is ill-defined and applies primarily 
to rare procedural anomalies." State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74, 
112, 10 P.3d 346 citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 
3 (Utah 1993) . This Court has previously dictated that 
"...the 'exceptional circumstances1 rubric [may be employed] 
where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law 
color [s] the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State 
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah App. 1996). 
Although no objection was made during the trial 
proceedings with respect to the issues argued below, it is 
clear that this case is a "rare procedural anomaly" that 
should be addressed by this Court. Holgate. As argued supra, 
this case is unique in that the trial court ordered DCFS to 
provide reunification services after the Termination Trial had 
already been held. The reliance upon those after-ordered 
services for a decision terminating Appellants parental 
rights raises the substantial question of whether the pre- or 
19 
post-amendment statutes apply. Due to this rare procedural 
anomaly, Appellant requests that this Court address the matter 
under the exceptional circumstances rubric. Holgate. 
Additionally, a change in law occurred during the midst 
of these proceedings which tainted Appellant counsel's ability 
to preserve the matters at trial. Irwin. The Termination 
Petition was filed on March 14, 2002. The 2002 amendments at 
issue here became effective as of May 6, 2002. On August 29, 
2002, the trial court ordered DCFS to provide an additional 
sixty (60) days of reunification services to Appellant. In 
Appellant's Docketing Statement filed March 28, 2003, 
Appellant challenged the trial court's conclusions of law 
based upon the 2002 amendments. On June 12, 2003, this Court 
rendered a decision setting the date of the filing of a 
termination petition as the guiding date for the applicability 
of the 2002 amendments; however, that decision has not yet 
been released for publication. Hence, there has been a 
change in law and the settled interpretation of the law in 
this matter and this Court should address the matter under the 
exceptional circumstances rubric. Irwin. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN RELYING UPON APPELLANT'S 
PERFORMANCE ON THE TREATMENT PLAN 
TO TERMINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS 
A. The Trial Court Had No Discretion to Terminate 
Appellant's Parental Rights Based Upon Her 
Performance Under the Sixty (60) Day Service Plan. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (2) (Supp. 2002) states that 
"[t]he court may not terminate the parental rights of a parent 
because the parent has failed to complete the requirements of 
a treatment plan." This subsection of UTAH CODE ANN. §78~3a-407 
was presented by Representative Throckmorton to the Utah 
Legislature in House Bill 226 during the 2002 General Session. 
After explaining the purposes of a service/treatment plan to 
the House of Representatives, Representative Throckmorton 
articulated the legislative intent behind creating this 
subsection, as follows: 
And what we've found is that sometimes those service 
plans can be so in detail, so encumbering that 
virtually nobody in the State of Utah would be able 
to complete some of those plans. And a concern is 
that you get towards the end of the proceeding and 
the Division in times past-and I haven't heard of 
this happening in the last few months-that there are 
times in which they will say, you know, they haven't 
completed the plan, and they don't base the 
determination to terminate parental rights on the 
fitness of the parent, whether or not they are doing 
the proper job, it's simply that they have not 
completed the plan. And so what this bill does is 
two parts, initially, and then there is some 
supporting language throughout the bill. The first 
one is found on lines 258 and 259, and it's a very 
strong statement, it says "the court may not 
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terminate the parental rights of a parent because 
the parent has failed to complete the requirements 
of a treatment plan." By placing that in section 
407, . . . one thing that they will not be able to 
use as a grounds to terminate a child is that they 
have technically not completed the plan. 
H.B. 226, Utah House of Representatives, February 5, 2002, 
2002 General Session, remarks of Representative Matt 
Throckmorton. 
On August 29, 2002, the trial court accepted the parties' 
agreement and ordered DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day 
treatment plan for Appellant in exchange for Appellant's 
admissions to the Termination Petition4. It was understood by 
the parties and the trial court that, if Appellant failed to 
comply with any aspect of the sixty (60) day service plan, the 
State or GAL could motion for the trial court to accept 
Appellant's admissions and enter judgment terminating her 
parental rights. See, Addendum "B." In effect at the time, 
however, was UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (2) (Supp. 2002), which 
4
 There is some confusion as to why Appellant was 
required to enter her admissions in exchange for the 
additional sixty (60) days of reunification services when 
the trial court had the authority to extend those without 
her admissions, especially in light of the fact that it had 
basically heard all of the evidence regarding the 
Termination Petition and still had reservations about 
whether it was in the Children's best interests to terminate 
Appellant's parental rights. It seems that extension of the 
reunification services was warranted, regardless of whether 
Appellant entered admissions to the Termination Petition or 
not. 
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denied the trial court any discretion to accept such an 
agreement in that it "...may not terminate the parental rights 
of Appellant..." based upon Appellant's performance under any 
service plan. 
The order granting the GAL's Motion, however, shows that 
the trial court abused its discretion and did rely upon 
Appellant's performance under the sixty (60) day service plan 
when it stated as follows: 
The Court hereby finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that [Appellant] failed to comply with the 
court-ordered service plan. Consequently, because 
[Appellant] has had ample opportunity to remedy the 
issues that caused the removal of her children into 
State's custody and has been unwilling or unable to 
comply with the services offered to her, the Court 
concludes that it would be in the best interest of 
the children to enter the admissions made by 
[Appellant] in open court on August 29, 2002. The 
motion of the Guardian ad Litem is hereby GRANTED, 
and the Court orders the Guardian ad Litem to 
prepare a separate Order of Termination of Parental 
Rights. 
See, Addendum "B." The only findings of fact entered in the 
order granting the GAL's Motion dealt directly with 
Appellant's performance under the service plan. Id. The 
trial court found that Appellant failed to comply with the 
court-ordered service plan. Id. Based on that finding, the 
trial court concluded that Appellant's admissions should be 
entered. Id. Based on that conclusion, it ordered the GAL 
to prepare the Termination Order. Id. The order granting the 
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GAL's Motion relies solely on Appellant's performance under 
the service plan to order the GAL to prepare the final order 
terminating her parental rights5. In essence, the trial court 
relied solely upon Appellant's performance under the service 
plan to find the second prong of best interests to terminate 
her parental rights. By the plain language of §78-3a-407 (2), 
the trial court abused its discretion. 
B. The Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion Prejudiced 
Appellant. 
As Representative Throckmorton stated, sole reliance upon 
the service plan to determine termination of parental rights, 
especially with 100 percent compliance set as the standard, 
creates an encumbrance upon Appellant that virtually no one in 
the State of Utah could stand up to. H.B. 226, Utah House of 
Representatives, February 5, 2002, 2002 General Session, 
remarks of Representative Matt Throckmorton. With such 
stringent requirements dealing with compliance, the trial 
5
 While it is true that the trial court had Appellant's 
admissions to the Termination Petition on which to base the 
termination, there were no other findings made at the 
evidentiary hearing outside of Appellant's performance on 
the service plan to base the trial court's conclusion that 
her admissions should be reinstated. Additionally, the 
trial court had the same admissions before it during the 
Initial Decision and found that the second prong of best 
interests of the Children could not be satisfied at that 
time. 
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court runs the risk of terminating her parental rights based 
on technicalities. 
For instance, perhaps Appellant does not possess the 
talent of organizing, all within sixty (60) days, a full time 
job with benefits sufficient to support her and the Children, 
housing, urinalysis tests, individual therapy, family therapy 
individually with each child, a parenting class6, and a 
domestic violence and anger management class7. Say that, 
hypothetically, because of this lack of organizational skills 
Appellant does not comply with the service plan 100 percent by 
maybe missing one important thing to deal with another 
important thing. This would technically be evidence of less 
than 100 percent compliance; however, this lack of 
organizational skills should not dictate that a person's 
parental rights should be terminated. Hence, just one of many 
reasons the Utah Legislature amended UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-4 07 
to include subsection (2). 
As shown in the Statement of Facts above, Appellant 
had already attended several classes; however, the sixty 
(60) day service plan indicated that she needed to take yet 
another one. 
7
 As shown in the Statement of Facts above, Appellant 
has attended a domestic violence class previously; however, 
the sixty (60) day service plan indicated that she needed to 
take yet anther one. 
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As stated by Representative Throckmorton, sole reliance 
upon the service plan also mistakenly shifts the focus of the 
trial court to the technicalities rather than the question of 
whether or not the parent is "doing the proper job." Id. 
H.B. 226, Utah House of Representatives, February 5, 2002, 
2002 General Session, remarks of Representative Matt 
Throckmorton. It becomes not a question of whether Appellant 
has substantially benefitted from the services to 
appropriately adjust her life as a parent for the Children, 
but rather it becomes a numbers game. By relying solely on 
the technicalities of a service plan, the real issue of 
whether the errors have been corrected gets seemingly lost, as 
happened here. The trial court should not have relied solely 
on Appellant's performance under the service plan for a 
determination as to termination of her parental rights. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENTER A 
FINDING OF REASONABLE SERVICES PRIOR 
TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 3 a - 4 0 7 ( 3 ) (Supp. 2002) s t a t e s a s 
f o l l o w s : 
(1) The court may terminate all parental 
rights with respect to a parent if it finds 
any one of the following: 
(a) that the parent has abandoned 
the child; 
(b) that the parent has neglected 
or abused the child; 
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(c) that the parent is unfit or 
incompetent; 
(f) that only token efforts have 
been made by the parent: 
(i) to support or 
communicate with the 
child; 
(ii) to prevent neglect 
of the child; 
(iii) to eliminate the 
risk of serious 
physical, mental, or 
emotional abuse of the 
child; or 
(iv) to avoid being an 
unfit parent; 
(3) (a) In any case in which the court has 
directed the division to provide 
reunification services to a parent, the 
court must find that the division made 
reasonable efforts to provide those 
services before the court may terminate the 
parent's rights under Subsection (l)(b), 
(c), (d), (e), (f) or (h) . 
(Emphasis added). It is well established that ff[t]he form of 
the verb used in a statute, i.e., something fmay, f 'shall1 or 
'must' be done, is the single most important textual 
consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or 
directory," State in Interest of M.C. , 940 P.2d 1229 (Utah 
App. 1997) quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 57.03, at 7 (5th ed.1992). Black's Law 
Dictionary, Abridged Fifth Edition, at page 530, states that 
the word "must," like the word "shall," is primarily of 
mandatory effect. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (3) (a) states that 
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the finding "must" be made and is, therefore, of mandatory 
effect. 
The trial court entered an order <3ri September 9, 2002, 
requiring DCFS to provide services to Appellant in the form of 
a sixty (60) day service plan. At a hearing held December 23, 
2002, the trial court determined that Appellant failed to 
comply 100 percent with the sixty (60) day service plan and 
ordered the GAL to prepare the Termination Order. The 
Termination Order terminated Appellant's parental rights 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (1) (b), (c), (d), and (e). 
According to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (3) (a) (Supp. 2002), 
if the trial court has ordered reunification services be 
provided by DCFS, the trial court does not have discretion to 
terminate parental rights under Subsection (l)(b), (c), (d), 
and (e) , without first finding that those services were 
reasonable. The plain language of the statute shows that the 
finding regarding whether the services offered by DCFS are 
reasonable is mandatory, because the trial court "must" enter 
the finding. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a~407 (3) (a) (Supp. 2002) . 
The Termination Order is void of the requisite finding of 
§78-3a-407(3)(a) (Supp. 2002). Based on this void, the 
findings of fact contained in the Termination Order do not and 
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cannot support the conclusions entered by the trial court 
pursuant to §78-3a-407 (l)(b), (c) , (d), and (e). 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's Termination Order and remand the matter for a new 
trial in accordance with the requirements of the 2002 
amendments. 
DATED this 19th day of June, 2002. 
Gary L. Bell 
Counsel for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT .JUVENILE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of: 
HARTWELL, SARA (07/30/85) 
S E L O N G . REBECCA (09/09/88) 
DELONG, TAYLOR (U./23/90) 
DELONG, PHILLIP (04/14/94) 
Children under IS years of age 
FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS 
S L A W AND ORDER TERMINATING 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Case Nos- 926186.926199. 016201. 926202 
judue Frederick M-Oddone 
, ^
 t re ived evidence in the trial of the State's <v> •»* T7amP9 2002. the Court tecen-tacviuw On August 2 , . 26.27 and _ K On August ±j. -v.. ^, 
Petition for the Termination of The Parental Rights of Leanne Delong and Daniel Delong. 
Present were the natural mother. Leanne Delong. represented by Francis Angle}. the caseworker 
for the Division of Child and Family Services. Heather Zahn, represented by Sheila Page. 
Assistant Attorney General, and the Guardian ad Litem. Mollic McDonald. Daniel Delong's 
attorney, Justin Jensen, was also present and Mr. Delong appeared by telephone to give 
testimony. 
At the close of the trial. Leanne Delong was advised of her due process rights and. at that 
time, entered an admission to the facts alleged in the State's Petition for Termination of Parental 
Rights. On the basis of Ms. Dclong's admission, the Court makes the following findings of tacl-
d v e ^ O BO 92 -«M 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. Leann Delong is the natural mother of Sara HartwelK Rebecca Dclong. Taylor Defong 
and Phillip Delong. 
2. Daniel Delong is the natural father of Rebecca Delong. Taylor Delong and Phillip 
Delong. During the nine years of Mr. and Mrs. Delong's marriage. Daniel Delong was the step-
father of Sara Hartwell. 
3. Taylor Delong was adjudicated as an abused child and Taylor. Rebecca. Phillip and 
Sara were adjudicated as neglected on July 3,2001. 
4. These children have been in the custody and guardianship of the Division since July 16. 
2001 due to the incarceration of the mother following her criminal conviction for physically 
abusing Taylor. The mother served 60 days of a one year sentence and was released on probation 
5. Leann Delong has foiled to comply with either the criminal courf s orders regarding 
contact with children or this court's orders regarding visitation and contact with her children. She 
has consistently attempted contact with the children outside the boundaries set for her visitation. 
6. Taylor has required hospitalization due to his fragile emotional state. Ta\ lor\s 
condition has been exacerbated by contact with his mother. Ms. Delong has repeatedlv ignored 
orders not to attempt contact directly with Taylor. In December 200 K Ms. Delong ignored DCFS 
and Taylor's therapists directives not to contact or attempt to contact Taylor, and engaged in 
repeated telephone calls to Taylor's cottage at Primary Children's Residential Unit. Taylor's 
response to these calls was to start cutting on himself and an attempt to hang himself The calls 
on stopped when Ms. Delong was arrested. 
7. In January 2002, Judge Christiansen revoked Leannc Delong's probation for her 
dfr£iLO £0 92 J*W 
• j^lui""* *)» "r. no contact order and imposed the 305 days I i! ^ence. 
8. The children are all doing better in titeir placements witliout contact with their mother. 
9. f\\ (.oriiinii (•» her psychological evaluation, Leanne Delong has no ii^ivli' mu > in i 
behavior and presents a physical and emotional risk to her children. 
I' > tViuAmcl FVntty's whereabouts are unknown, and he has provkl 
emotional or financial support for Sara I iartweJI. 
State has attempted to provide the mother with numeiut, . indication services 
since the adjudication of the shelter p* he children. The State has provided the mother 
with: a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a psychological cxaniuuf ion, t-eterrals for treatment 
therapeutic visitation, appointed legal counsel 
13, The mother has tailed to comply with the terras of her sec vice plan, am I failed to 
comply with the terms ^1 N,,T probation. 
14. The children are all placed instable • *.; : v^ine-s whet- their spec uil needs are 
being met. I lie children all have appropriate contact with eacv \u : J. eiors have 
improved. It is in the best interest ot uintain this arrangement, inasmuch as there 
'were no suitable relative placements available to take the children as a sib*uu,. L 
CONCl tfSrONSOFLAW 
Based on the Court's findings that Leann Detong la\\t\ I u> comi»K with the Com t. u,u 
service plan, the > >y n i IicirP" accepts Ms. Delong's admissions made in op^n court \ »i» ;\ i.;;ust 
29.2002 and reaches the following conclusions of law: 
1. That the children have been neglected as defined in UCA § 78-^a- 103{ f )(q): an< 1 
2. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78 3a-407(2) (1 "994), Leann Delong has neglected 
or abused her children, thereby justifying termination of their parental rights. 
d 4 r c : A n i;i: '*. 
3. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. <? /h u-»u/( T) (1994), Leann Deiong isanunfitor 
incompetent parents, *istifying termination of their parental rights. 
4. That pursuant to UCA §78-3a-407(4) (1994), .< ^ > i o r and Phillip have 
been cared for in an out-of-home placements under the supervision of the Division of Child and 
Family Services. The agency has made diligent efforts to pre '« ** ?< services to f hv 
mother which she has substantially neglected, wilfully refiiscd, or has been unable or unwilling i« 
remedy the circumstances that caused the children to -. •< .V-tr, 'im'nu-.-i. ami thru 
is a substantial Likelihood that the parents will not be capable of exercising proper and effective 
parental care in the near fixture, thereby justifying a termination ol" their parental rights. 
- y\v\\ pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(5) (1994), Lcinn i Hon*: n«f» failed to 
make a parental adjustment, thereb termination of her parental rights. 
6 ! hat pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a~409< I »' j ii.. ,.hv^, ii. mental and 
emotional conditions and neeo nandates that they be adopted by parents who are 
v ilii m: and able to meet their special conditions and needs 
. ; - iterest of these children for the legal rights of'die !ia!iir;il I^C.III , 
to be terminated. 
8 That it is propex that an "order be entered terminating the rights of Leanne Delong. to 
Sara HartwelL RebeccaDelong. Taylor IMhnxii >md Phillip Delong. 
Cjfr| ; > • , I" i i ' l .> - * K k 
OR»ERTERMINATlN<; PARENTAL RIGHTS 
• r *f im of Fact and Conclusions of Law. the Court hereby 
Based on the foregomg r indmgs ol Mot an 
°
R D E R S :
 ,
 u - ™ . | | Rebecca Delong. Taylor Delor,e 
, Theparcntairi^ofLeannDe.on.toSaaHaxt.ell.RcKc 
„ , ,11 , pcii liin! parental rigi its 
« i p D * * - h e * S n a r e d . — - V - - ' - > ^ 
H ««tndv of the Utah Division ot Lhild and 
.t;r,i,ffi in the care and custoay ui u«. 2. The children are continued IU me t«u 
• * * P miroose of/^option or independent living. 
Family Services for the purpose ow v 
Dated this _H__dayof 
dm : / n t:u y<i J H W 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the V^ 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings 
postage prepaid, to: 
Sheila Page 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South. 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114 
Robert Barron 
Attorney for Leann Delong 
254 West 400 South, Ste. 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Justin Jensen 
Attorney for Daniel Delong 
1192 East Draper Parkway, #467 
Draper, UT 84020 
4 Wujw 
day of fkV^ar^t . _><><» i ,jifu., ..„) 
occlusions of Law and Order was mailed. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT .JUVENILE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of: 
HARTWELL, SARA (07/30/85) 
DELONG. REBECCA (09/09/88) 
DELONG, TAYLOR (11/23/90) 
DELONG. PHILLIP (04/14/94) 
Children under 18 years of age 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT. AND 
ORDER GRANTING THE 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM'S MOTION 
TO ENTER JUDGMENT ON THE 
STATE'S PETITION TO TERMINATE 
THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF 
LEANN DELONG 
Case Nos. 9 lb I No • . i > I '>'' (>! 6201. 926202 
Judge Frederick M. Oddone 
On Decembe: _ • >urt heard evidence on the Guardian ad Litem s M, «iion to 
Judgment or '••M Siate's Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of Leann Dclong. 
Present were the n.- • -.'.rr i )el<>ng. represented by Robert Barron, the caseworker 
for the Division of Child and Famih b. : -
 :>.< s. Wendy Ottcly. rcpresemed by Sheila Cage. 
AsMsi.ini \!torney General, and the Guardian ad Litem. Mollie McDonald. 
PRE VK H is ORDERS OF THE COURT 
On August 29.2002. Leann Delong entered admisMO"S to the State's Petition to 
Terminate the Parental Right* •">' i eann Delong. At that time the Court rule is. 
Delong *s admissions, there were statutory grounds to terminate the parei'!a! • n u s oi i , ..-in 
Delong and Daniel Deiom. :e Court had lingering concerns about 
rttit. - M l t'.l'f .'6 ~**w 
'be in the best interest of the children to terminate Ms (,'etomi •< parental n<rhis in \w\\i of the tail 
that Ms. Defong had only recently been released from jail and had not had sufficient time to 
begin individual therapy or look for housing and employment, i noivi i m *' n > «  < look Leann 
Delong's admission under advisement for sixty days. During those sixty days, die Court' ordered 
that Ms. Delong strictly comply with the court-ordered service plan which was adopted at a 
hearing held on September v .:«?!' >'» H I rder stated that if Ms. Delong failed to comply with 
any aspect of the service plan, the Attorney General or the cm could motion the 
Court to accept Ms. Delong's -idmissi ons and enter judgment terminating her parental rights. 
FINDINGS 1)1" i"A< r 
After truiHki the evidence presented in support of the Guardian ad Litem • M n « 
Enter Judgment on the State's Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of Leann Delong, the 
<' i u'1 HI ictt- (In: following findings of facts: 
• L Leann Delong tailed to tak<; uunioin urinalysis tests as ordered by the Court on 
September 9,2002; 
; 2. Leann Delong foiled to participate in individual therapy on a consistent basis as 
ordered by the Court on September 9,2002 and only complccecf two individual therapy sessions; 
• Kt^ -I > vioni'- violated the No Contact Order Entered on September v \k) ' by :il'. w 
and leaving messages for Emily xapist treating Rebecca Delong; 
4. Leann Delong failed to demonstrate that she mnttii,rned • n'^istcnt employment oi 
stable housing separate from other adults as ordered by the Court on September 9.2002. 
e 2 J G W 
ORDER 
The Court finds by <. • evidence that Leann Delong failed to comply 
^ourt-ordered service plan. Consequently, because Ms- Delong ha 
opportunity to remedy the issues that cause j- • of her children ••-<) State custody ai id 
UA\ IK-VM unwilling or unable to comply with the services offered to hoi*. flu1 ( nun, COIICIIK les thai 
it would be in the best interest of inr * hi J< ire.? TO outer the admissions made by Ms. Delong in 
open court on August 29 200,2. The motion of the Guardiai i ad l noi .• I .MIH ill? \N FED, and 
the Court orders the Guardian ad I item to prepare a septirate Order of Termination of Parental 
Rights. 
BY' 
. . . . ._„_ H I 
d c R : / . n Pf M 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify \L^ day of fafoVO^ . 2003, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 1 -aw and Order was mailed-
postage prepaid in 
Sheila Page 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Robert Barron 
Attorney for Leann Delong 
254 West 400 South. Ste. 320 
Sail Lake City, UT 84101 
Justin Jensen 
Attorney for Daniel Delong 
1192 East Draper Parkway, #467 
Draper. UT 84020 
Aarz/n P I 9E jUW 
Addendum C 
Findings OJ h \-i ct , \,\<uciu.s j c > / /.s ' / /,-} w 
a n d Order, d a t e d S e p t e m b e r ' \ •'OiV1 
Mollie McDonald (#8589) 
Office of the Guardian ad Litem 
450 South State, Suite W-22 
P.O. Box 140403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0403 
Telephone: (801) 578-3962 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of: 
HARTWELL, SARA (07/30/85) ; 
DELONG, REBECCA (09/09/88) ] 
DELONG, TAYLOR (11/23/90) ) 
DELONG, PHILLIP (04/14/94) ) 
Children under 18 years of age ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW AND ORDER 
CaseNos. 926186, 926199, 916201, 926202 
Judge Frederick M. Oddone 
On August 23, 26, 27 and 29,2002, the Court received evidence in the trial of the State's 
Petition for the Termination of The Parental Rights of Leanne Delong and Daniel Delong. 
Present were the natural mother, Leanne Delong, represented by Francis Angley, the caseworker 
for the Division of Child and Family Services, Heather Zahn, represented by Sheila Page, 
Assistant Attorney General, and the Guardian ad Litem, Mollie McDonald. Daniel Delong's 
attorney, Justin Jensen, was also present and Mr. Delong appeared by telephone to give 
testimony. 
At the close of the trial and after a review of the evidence with her counsel Ms. Leanne 
Delong was advised of her due process rights and, at that time, entered her admission to the 
Petition for Termination of Parental Rights. On the basis of Ms. Delong's admission, the Court 
makes the following findings of fact: 
it 
tf»X 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Sara HartweiL Rebecca Delong, Taylor Delong and Phillip Delong are in the custody 
of the Division of Child and Family Services, and are the natural children of Leanne Delong. 
3. Taylor Delong was adjudicated as an abused child and Taylor, Rebecca, Phillip and 
Sara were adjudicated as neglected on July 3, 2001. 
4. These children have been in the custody and guardianship of the Division since July 16, 
2001 due to the incarceration of the mother following her criminal conviction for physically 
abusing Taylor. The mother served 60 days of a one year sentence and was released on probation. 
5. Leanne Delong has failed to comply with either the criminal court's orders regarding 
contact with children or this court's orders regarding visitation and contact with her children. She 
has consistently attempted contact with the children outside the boundaries set for her visitation. 
6. Taylor has required hospitalization due to his fragile emotional state. Taylor's 
condition has been exacerbated by contact with his mother. Ms. Delong has repeatedly ignored 
orders not to attempt contact directly with Taylor. In December 2001, Ms. Delong ignored DCFS 
and Taylor's therapists directives not to contactor attempt to contact Taylor, and engaged in 
repeated telephone calls to Taylor's cottage at Primary Children's Residential Unit. Taylor's 
response to these calls was to start cutting on himself and an attempt to hang himself. The calls 
on stopped when Ms. Delong was arrested. 
7. In January 2002, Judge Christiansen revoked Leanne Delong's probation for her 
violation of the no contact order and imposed the 305 days left on her jail sentence. 
8. The Children are all doing better in their placements without contact with their mother. 
9. According to her psychological evaluation, Leanne Delong has no insight into her 
behavior and presents a physical and emotional risk to her children. 
10. Michael Beatty's whereabouts are unknown, and he has provided no physical, 
emotional or financial support for Sare Hartwell 
11. Daniel Delong has a history of criminal conduct and engaged in sexually 
inappropriate behavior with Sara and Rebecca. He has been in mental health counseling for many 
years and is not emotionally able to care for any of his children. 
12. The State has attempted to provide the mother with numerous reunification services 
since the adjudication of the shelter petition on the children. The State has provided the mother 
with: a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a psychological examination, referrals for treatment 
therapeutic visitation, appointed legal counsel. 
13. The mother has failed to comply with the terms of her service plan, and failed to 
comply with the terms of her probation . 
14. Sara is in Odyssey House and the other children are in placed in separate placements 
where their special needs are being met. The children all have appropriate contact with each other 
and their behaviors have improved. It is in the best interest of the children to maintain this 
arrangement, inasmuch as there were no suitable relative placements available to take the children 
as a sibling group. 
15. At the request of all counsel the court met separately with each of the children and 
counsel in chambers. Sara is almost 18 years old. Sara does not wish to return to live with her 
mother but does hope to establish some sort of undefined contact with her at a later point in Sara's 
life. Rebecca age 14, Taylor age 12, and Phillip age 8 are all in foster care. Each child expressed 
a desire to have a continuing relationship of varying degrees with their mother if Ms. DeLong 
could stabilize her life and benefit from counseling. None of them wished to return to live with 
Ms. DeLong until she had the benefit of counseling and demonstrated progress. 
16. Each child is flourshing and doing well in foster care with the state of Utah. However 
the state is unable to place all of the children together in an adoptive home. Nor does the state 
currently have adoptive homes for either of the boys individually. 
17. Ms. DeLong was in jail for approximately 8 months of her service plan. While in jail 
she attended a number of classes on parenting and substance abuse. However the court had no 
way of measuring what changes and improvements if any in her skills as a parent as the petition 
to terminate her parental rights was filed approximately three weeks after her release from jail. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
On the basis of the facts admitted to by Leanne Delong, the Court reaches the following 
conclusions of law: 
1. That the children have been neglected as defined in UCA § 78-3a-103(l)(q); and, 
2. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(2) (1994), Leanne DeLong and Daniel 
DeLong have neglected or abused their children, thereby justifying termination of their parental 
rights. 
3. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(3) (1994), Leanne DeLong and Daniel 
DeLong are unfit or incompetent parents, thereby justifying termination of their parental rights. 
4. That pursuant to UCA §78-3a-407(4) (1994), Sara, Rebecca, Taylor and Phillip have 
been cared for in an out-of-home placements under the supervision of the Division of Child and 
Family Services. The agency has made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services to the 
mother which she has substantially neglected, wilfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling to 
remedy the circumstances that caused the children to be in an out-of-home placements, and there 
is a substantial likelihood that the parents will not be capable of exercising proper and effective 
parental care in the near future, thereby justifying a termination of their parental rights. 
5. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(5) (1994), Leanne DeLong has failed to 
make a parental adjustment, thereby justifying a termination of her parental rights. 
6. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(6) (1994), Daniel DeLong has made 
only token efforts to support or communicate with her children, or to eliminate the risk of serious 
physical, mental, or emotional abuse, or to avoid being an unfit parent, thereby justifying a 
termination of the parental rights. 
7. There are adequate legal grounds to terminate the rights of both parents however 
the court feels it is in the best interest of these children for them to remain in foster care and if the 
mother is unable to demonstrate significant and reasonable progress in therapy within the next 
sixty days or if she violates the order as set forth above that upon motion of the guardian ad litem 
or the attorney general that the court accept the mother's admission to the petition to terminate her 
legal rights. The court notes that while there are sufficient grounds to terminate the rights of the 
father it believes that it is in the best interests of the children to defer that decision until a 
determination on the rights of the mother is finalized. 
ORDER 
Although the Court finds that there are statutory grounds to terminate the parental rights of 
Leanne Deiong and Daniel Delong, based on the comments of the children, their ages, and the 
lack of adoptive placements, the Court has reservations whether a termination of Ms. Delong's 
parental rights at this time in the children's best interests. Therefore, on stipulation of all parties 
the Court takes Leanne Delong's admission under advisement for sixty days. During those sixty 
days, the Court enters the following orders: 
1. Ms. Delong have no contact with the children, Sara Hartwell, Rebecca Delong, Taylor 
Delong and Phillip Delong, and further that Ms. Delong make no attempts to contact either the 
children or their foster families, schools, therapists or medical providers. 
2. Ms. Delong is ordered not to use any controlled substance, or consume any alcoholic 
beverages. Ms. Delong is ordered to submit to random drug testing and release the results of the 
drug tests to DCFS. 
3. Ms. Delong is ordered to maintain consistent employment and must provide proof of 
her employment to DCFS. 
4. Ms. Delong is ordered to find and maintain her own housing separate from other adults. 
5. Ms. Delong is ordered to enter into individual counseling with a therapist agreed upon 
by DCFS and the GAL. Ms. Delong must have at least one appointment per week with her 
individual therapist. 
6. Ms. Delong is ordered to have an evaluation by a psychiatrist to determine if psycho 
tropic medication is appropriate. If Ms. Delong either violates any of the preceding orders, or 
fails to make progress in her individual therapy, DCFS or the GAL may file a motion requesting 
that the Court accept Ms. DeLong's admission to the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights. 
It is expressly understood that any hearing on such a motion will only be concerned with her 
inability or refusal to comply with the orders as set forth above and will not revisit her admission 
to the petition to terminate or any of the facts already adjudicated. 
Additionally, the Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to prepare a service 
plan for Ms. Delong by September 9,2002, which will become part of the Court's order. 
DATED this ( _ day of September, 2002. 
BY THE coy&j; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ' day of ^ r v
 y 2000, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Order was faxed to: 
Sheila Page 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Francis A. Angley 
Attorney for Leanne Delong 
254 West 400 South, Ste.320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Fax:359-6873 
Justin Jensen 
Attorney for Dan Delong 
1192 East Draper Parkway, #467 
Draper, UT 84020 
Fax: 545-8902 
this day of , 2002. 
